T h e su d d en and un ex p ected d eath of N o r m a n L aurence F r a n k l in at th e age of 62 sadden ed th e w hole B ritish n u clear in d u stry in w hich he had w orked for th e m ajo rity of his professional career. N ed F ran k lin -he was know n universally as N ed -was recognized as th e g reat th in k er and analyst of th e nuclear in d u stry in this co u n try . H is ability to extract the m ax im u m of in fo rm atio n from data th a t was, in the early years of the n u clear in d u stry , freq u en tly very sparse, enabled h im to find solutions som etim es well ahead of his co n tem p o raries. T h e ad o p tio n in this c o u n try of th e cen trifu g e m eth o d for the en ric h m en t of u ran iu m , a process th a t has now becom e a m ajor in d u stry , o rig in ated fro m an o u tsta n d in g analysis m ade by him in the late 1960s. T h is analytical ability also enabled him to m ake a m ajor c o n trib u tio n in risk analysis, a su b ject to w hich he devoted m u ch tim e and th o u g h t later in his career. E arly years N ed F ran k lin was b o rn in th e o u tsk irts of L eeds on 1 S ep te m b er 1924, th e only child of W illiam A lexander and B eatrice F ran k lin . T h e re is little reco rd ed of his early school years b u t he fou n d stu d y easy and did well at ev ery th in g he attem p ted . H e w ent on to Batley G ra m m a r School in 1934 w hen his love of cricket cam e to th e fore as a m em b er of th e 1st eleven. H is o th e r sp o rt was lo n g -d istan ce ru n n in g , n o t p erh ap s w hat one w ould have expected b u t nevertheless typical of th e tenacity he show ed in later life.
In 1942 he w ent to the U n iv ersity of L eeds w here, in the F acu lty of C hem ical E ngineerin g , he qualified w ith first-class h o n o u rs in F uel E n g in eerin g in 1945. H is last year at un iv ersity was heavily biased tow ards research in aid of the w ar effort, p articu larly in relation to incendiary devices.
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E arly pr o fe ssio n a l career O n leaving L eeds U n iv ersity in 1945 he jo in ed th e B ritish Coke R esearch A ssociation, at first as a T ech n ical Officer in L o n d o n , only to be asked a little later to take charge of a R esearch U n it at P o n ty p rid d in S outh W ales.
T h e problem he was given to solve was how to avoid dam age to coke ovens resulting from th e expansion of th e charge d u rin g the carb o n izatio n process. T h e p lan t and the ex p erim en tal process was sim ple and u nsophisticated by com parison w ith th e type of analytical research he was to do later in his career, b u t the overw h elm in g im pression of the m any papers he w rote d u rin g this perio d was of the m eticu lo u s care he took in avoiding u n contro lled variables and the th o ro u g h investigation of the effects of all the co n tro lled variables th a t could be relevant to the results.
Coal is an insufficiently hom ogeneous a m aterial to be am enable to precise num erical evaluation, b u t the stu d y of different coals and different blends of coals yielded, in a relatively sh o rt tim e, an effective operating m anual th a t defined the p ro ced u res and the b len d in g ratios th a t had to be used if the coking ovens w ere to be o p erated w ith o u t sticking of the charge or dam age to th e lining of th e walls.
It was not, how ever, an en v iro n m en t w ith enough intellectual challenge to satisfy for long N e d 's e n q u irin g m in d , and in 1948 he re tu rn e d to the U n iv ersity of L eeds as an assistant le ctu rer in the D ep a rtm e n t of C hem ical E ngineering, becom ing a le ctu rer in 1950. H e im m ediately becam e involved in research, choosing the solution of d istillatio n and separation prob lem s as his field of investigation. It suited N e d 's abilities adm irably. O ne of his first pap ers describ ed the co n stru ctio n and operation of a m echanical analogue m achine for the solution of d istillation problem s. T h e very title of this p ap er reveals a great deal ab o u t N ed him self. T h e re is no way one could design a m echanical analogue m achine to solve d istillation p ro b lem s unless the process of d istillation and the operation of d istillation colum ns w ere com pletely u n d ersto o d .
H is later researches and pap ers w ere of a m uch m ore m ath em atical and statistical nature. T h e y led to an investigation of catalyst d evelopm ent and the application of statistical m eth o d s to th e dev elo p m en t of catalysts for the vapour phase oxidation of n ap h th alen e. D u rin g this period at L eeds U n iv ersity he also found tim e to p u b lish tw o books of w hich one, S ta tistica l analysis in chemistry and the chemical industry was w ritten at P rin ceto n U niv ersity , jo in tly w ith C arl B ennett, and becam e a stan d ard text on the subject.
It was w hen he was at L eeds U n iv ersity th a t N ed m arried , in 1949, Bessie C opeland. It was a h appy m arriage in w hich they w ere ideally suited to each o ther. T h e y had tw o child ren , E lizabeth and R obert. N ed was always very m uch a fam ily m an and w hen he was n ot w orking at his p ro fessio n he enjoy ed sp en d in g his tim e w ith his fam ily and in hom e p u rsu its. H e sp en t a g reat deal of tim e w ith his ch ild ren and was very in te re ste d in th e ir schooling, th e ir gam es and th e ir ed u catio n . R o b ert, after leaving school, stu d ie d civil en g in eerin g and geology and w ent into th e oil in d u stry . N ed becam e a passable ex p ert in all th ree, in p a rt because of n a tu ra l in te re st and a th irs t for know ledge, b u t also to be able to help and to talk to R o b ert ab o u t his su b ject far b ey o n d th e stage w here m ost p a re n ts have been left b eh in d .
C areer in t h e n u c lea r in d u s t r y It was in 1955 th a t I first m et N ed F ran k lin w h en I was able to p ersu ad e him to jo in o u r sm all team at Risley, engaged on fo rm u latin g the T ec h n ic a l Policy of th e P ro d u c tio n G ro u p of th e A tom ic E nergy A u th o rity . It was an en v iro n m e n t th a t su ited ideally N e d 's th irs t for know ledge, his analytical m in d an d his ex tra o rd in ary ability to look at any tech n ical p ro b lem and be able to list all th e issues and possible solutions. A t th a t tim e th e first p lan ts for th e p ro d u c tio n of p lu to n iu m and highly e n ric h ed u ra n iu m w ere in o p eratio n . E x ten sio n s and ancillary u n its w ere u n d e r c o n stru c tio n as w ere th e C ald er H all reactors. It was a tim e w hen m a jo r im p ro v em en ts in efficiency and increases in o u tp u t could be achieved by changes in th e flow sheet o f th e o p eratio n s and th e way in w hich d ifferent u n its, p articu la rly th e sep aratio n stages for the isotopic e n ric h m e n t of u ra n iu m , w ere o p erated .
It was a tim e w hen w eapons design was alterin g radically and changes w ere being m ade to th e specifications for th e n u clear p ro d u cts and the relative q u an tities in w hich they w ere needed. It was a tim e w hen H arw ell was prolific w ith ideas for new reacto r concepts, th e high te m p e ra tu re reacto r and th e fast reacto r am ong m any. A ltern ativ e m eth o d s for the p rocessing of u ra n iu m an d irrad iated fuel elem ents w ere also being investigated. It was a tim e of u n p rece d en ted change in th e way n uclear facilities w ere o p erated to m eet ever ch anging req u ire m en ts b o th for civil research and defence req u ire m en ts. A nd all the tim e urgency and speed w ere p rio rities, so m eth in g so often fo rg o tten today.
It was a tim e w hen N ed could use his pow ers of analysis and evaluation to th e full. T h e re was no p ossibility of p u ttin g all these new ideas and concepts into o peratio n on an in d u strial scale and the vast m ajority had to be w eeded out. O nly very few could even progress as far as a pilot p lan t or d em o n stratio n plan t. It is an in d u stry w here research is relatively cheap, d ev elo p m en t is very expensive and com m ercial exploitation has to be done on a nation al if n o t in tern atio n al scale.
N ed was a prolific w riter of pap ers on a w hole range of nuclear m atters. M any w ere o. course related to defence, b u t those th a t related to nuclear pow er and, w h ;ch w ere in general unclassified, w ere given at in tern atio n al conferences and discussion gro u p s in m any countries. N ed rapidly becam e know n on th e w orld nu clear scene as a practical analyst w ith an unusually w ide ap p reciatio n of nu clear issues. H is u n d erstan d in g of chem ical engineering and m athem atical and statistical analysis, coupled w ith the practical reality of o p eratin g coke ovens in S o u th W ales, m ade him a form idable m em b er of the team th a t was at the h eart of p lan n in g the p ro d u ctio n operatio n s of the n u clear in d u stry of th a t tim e. N e d 's activities in T ech n ical Policy w ere in te rru p te d for a sh o rt p erio d w hen, for about six m o n th s in 1958, he becam e special assistant to the M anaging D irecto r, S ir L eo n ard O w en. D u rin g this perio d he had the o p p o rtu n ity of considerable travel in relation to the availability of u ran iu m ores and p o ten tiality of heav y -w ater p ro d u ctio n . B ut m ore im p o rtan t in the long ru n was th a t N ed acq u ired , very early on, a b ro ad perspective of in d u strial attitu d es in the o u tsid e w orld, a p erspective th a t was later to be so valuable to him in dealing w ith w hat was to becom e an in tern atio n al nuclear in d u stry . H e re tu rn e d to T ech n ical Policy som e tim e later after a sh o rt spell at th e C haplecross reacto r site w here, as technical m anager, he was con cern ed w ith th e com m issioning of th e new reactors. It was, I th in k , here th a t he recognized the im p o rtan ce of the stability, docility and slow b u t sure response of the gas-cooled reactors, w hich in later years he describ ed as 'o p erato r frie n d ly ' reactors.
It was an intensely in terestin g b u t n ev erth eless tro u b lin g tim e. M u ch had been learnt ab o u t the o p eratio n of n u clear p lan t b u t at th e sam e tim e it was w idely recognized th a t th ere was a lot th a t was still n o t know n. T h is was b ro u g h t hom e d ram atically by the fire in one of th e W indscale piles. T h is had resulted from in ad eq u ate co n tro l of tech n iq u es im p ro v ized to alleviate an effect q u ite u n k n o w n and u n fo rseen w hen they w ere designed. T h e re was great concern ab o u t the possible d eterio ratio n of m aterials or com ponents sub jected to reacto r co n d itio n s and n e u tro n irrad iatio n . T h e possibility th a t a nuclear station m ig h t have to be sh u t dow n, possibly p erm an en tly , by the inability to rep air som e p erh ap s q u ite sm all co m ponent was n ot to be taken lightly.
T h ese concerns and th e ir possible effect on op eratio n , safety and th e lifetim e of nuclear p lan t becam e p aram o u n t, p articu larly as co n stru ctio n of th e first civil nuclear pow er stations was p ro ceeding apace. T h e fuel elem ents w ith th e ir ard u o u s co n d itio n s had always been th e m ost difficult and least reliable p art of a n u clear reactor. It was th o u g h t th a t the perform ance of the fuel elem ents w ould be the key to m aking or breaking nuclear pow er as a reliable source of electricity.
N ed, w ho had been given special resp o n sib ility for fuel elem ent design and evaluation, applied h im self to the p ro b lem . In a way rem in iscen t of his tim e on coking ovens, he set ab o u t designing ex p erim en ts to p rovide the necessary in fo rm atio n to ascertain how the fuel elem ents w ould perform in civil reactor co nditions. H ow long could they be expected to operate w ith o u t failure or d eterio ratio n ? W h at refuelling sequence should be adopted for the nu clear stations th a t w ere by th en gettin g close to c o m p letio n ? H is p ap ers and co n clu sio n s w ere p erfect exam ples of e x tra ctin g th e m ax im u m o f in fo rm atio n fro m very sparse data. M u ch had to be based on ex tra p o latio n because definitive ex p erim en ts on fuel lifetim e could n o t be co m p leted b efore decisions h ad to be taken.
In th e event th e p ro b lem s in th e civil n u clear p ro g ram m e cam e not fro m th e fuel elem en ts th a t p erfo rm e d o u tsta n d in g ly well, b u t fro m m ore co n v en tio n al p a rts of th e p la n t th a t h ad n o t had th e sam e d ev elo p m en t and te stin g p ro g ram m e ap p lied to th em . T h is was a resu lt of settin g up th e n u clear in d u stry in 1955 in a w ay th a t gave all w eight to th e cause of co m p e titio n and v irtu ally n o n e to th e m erits of rep licatio n , or th e scale of te ch n ical resource and co m p eten ce re q u ire d to b u ild com plex en g in eerin g u n d e rta k in g s efficiently an d on tim e. In spite of m any efforts in w hich N e d F ra n k lin played his full p art, it was n o t possible to get ag reem en t to re s tru c tu re th e in d u stry an d co rrect th is serious fau lt u n til 1973, nearly 20 years after th e m istake h ad been m ade. E ven th e n th e difficulties th a t h ad been created by th e o rd erin g of too m any d ifferen t designs of n u clear statio n w ere still th e re to plague N e d 's life m any years later w hen he was to in h e rit th e m an ag em en t of th e n u clear co n stru ctio n in d u stry .
N e d achieved rap id p ro m o tio n and it was as D e p u ty M an ag in g D ire c to r of th e P ro d u c tio n G ro u p th a t he took a p artic u la r in terest in th e d ev elo p m en t of th e u ltra -c e n trifu g e for th e e n ric h m en t of u ran iu m . It was th is d ev elo p m en t and th e lau n ch in g of th e cen trifu g e as an in te rn a tio n a l p ro ject th a t I am sure N ed reg ard ed as his greatest achievem ent.
T h e situ a tio n facing th e P ro d u c tio n G ro u p in 1967 was a difficult one. T h e diffusion p la n t at C a p e n h u rst, even after th e co m p letio n of th e first u p g rad e, was still very sm all and co n seq u en tly inefficient com p ared w ith th e very large A m erican plan ts. It was n o t co m p etitiv e econom ically and it could n o t expect to co n tin u e indefinitely as it was. E xpansion, how ever, was technically possible an d a m ajo r d ev elo p m en t p ro g ram m e to b u ild larger, high-efficiency stages was un d erw ay . N ed was involved in neg o tiatio n s w ith th e R T Z g ro u p th a t led to a p roposal being su b m itted to g o v ern m e n t for th e c o n stru ctio n of a new p u rp o se -b u ilt n uclear statio n , w hich w ould su p p ly h alf its o u tp u t to a new alu m in iu m sm elter an d th e o th e r half to an en larg ed diffusion plan t. A n econom ic solution seem ed possible. It was, how ever, ju s t ab o u t this tim e th a t the A m ericans red u ce d fu rth e r th e ir prices for e n ric h m en t and again it ap p eared as th o u g h th e re was no w ay of achieving a so u n d econom ic base for e n ric h in g u ra n iu m on this side of th e A tlan tic.
T h e stu d y of th e cen trifu g e process th a t was done by N ed F ran k lin at th is tim e was th erefo re a co m p ariso n of a new and u n trie d process against th e know ledge of w hat could, w ith n ear certain ty , be achieved by a diffusion p la n t w here th e re was already long o p eratin g experience. T he first analysis of th e cen trifu g e looked pro m isin g , b u t at th a t early stage in d ev elo p m en t the u n certain ties w ere large. W h at was clear was th a t routine m aintenan ce of m any th o u san d s of u n its, all in terco n n ected , was hardly econom ically possible. A key q u estio n was how long a cascade of th o u san d s of u n its co n stru cted w ith acceptably low costs could be expected to ru n w ith o u t m ain ten an ce or rep lacem en t of b earings or o th er key com ponents.
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O n m ost technological p ro jects it is possible to get help or advice or at least m ake an assessm ent o f w hat som eone else in th e sam e b u siness is doing. It is often possible to in sp ect an o th er p ro d u c t or p lan t to see how it is m ade. N o th in g like th a t was possible in u ran iu m en rich m en t. Ju st ab o u t all we knew ab o u t th e A m erican diffusion p lan ts was th a t they consum ed about as m u ch electricity as was g en erated in the w hole of the U .K . at th a t tim e, and th a t bicycles w ere used to go from one p art of the huge b u ild in g to an o th er. W ork on th e cen trifu g e was even m ore highly classified, not because the civil n u clear in d u stry was secretive b u t because it was recognized th a t the cen trifu g e could provide, w ith o u t the d a u n tin g costs of a diffusion plant, a p lan t capable of p ro d u cin g w eap o n s-g rad e 235U . T h is was in fo rm atio n the G o v ern m en t was rig h tly d eterm in e d should not get into th e h an d s of co u n tries th a t m ig h t m isuse the technology for w eapons p u rposes.
T h e decision to ad o p t th e cen trifu g e ro u te was taken on the basis of N e d 's analysis and advice. T h e G o v ern m en t was advised th a t we should proceed no fu rth e r w ith th e diffusion plan t. T h e d ev elo p m en t p ro g ram m e was abandoned and all efforts w ere d irected to the in fan t cen trifu g e th a t had at th a t tim e p ro d u ced virtu ally n o th in g except experim en tal results. It w ould today be called a courageous decision. P rogress on cen trifu g e developm ent accelerated rap id ly and a year or so later w h isp ers w ere heard that, in d ep en d en tly , th e G erm an s and th e D u tc h w ere developing versions of an u ltra-cen trifu g e. W e had m ade no an n o u n cem en t ab o u t w hat we w ere doing b u t recognized th a t w hat we w ere h earin g from G erm an y and H o llan d so u n d ed com pletely plausible.
It was ju s t ab o u t this tim e th a t the n o n -p ro life ratio n treaty was being signed by the four n u clear w eapons pow ers and n o n -p ro life ratio n was then, as it still is, a vital m a tte r of in tern atio n al security. It was quickly recognized th at th ree E u ro p ean co u n tries in d ep en d en tly developing a highly sensitive technology and being in com m ercial co m p etitio n , not only w ith each o th e r b u t also w ith th e huge diffusion p lan ts of th e U .S .A . and p e rh a p s also R ussia, was n o t th e b est way to assu re safeg u ard in g of th e sensitive techno lo g y or to achieve tech nical and com m ercial success of th e E u ro p ea n pro jects. T h e G o v e rn m e n t was alerted to th e situ atio n w ith a reco m m en d atio n th a t th e U .K . sh o u ld ap p ro ach the G erm an and th e D u tc h g o v ern m e n ts w ith th e o bject of creatin g a single collaborative p ro ject. T h e G o v e rn m e n t agreed an d N ed took a m ajo r resp o n sib ility of g u id in g th e U .K . p ro ject an d u n d erta k in g , w ith of co u rse a p p ro p ria te g o v e rn m e n t officials, th e n eg o tiatio n of th e trip a rtite agreem en ts.
T h is phase of N e d 's career in th e n u clear in d u stry was, I am sure, b o th th e m o st rew ard in g and also th e m o st h arro w in g . T h e m o st rew ard in g because th e cen trifu g e has becom e an en o rm o u sly successful p ro ject. It has becom e a far b e tte r process for th e e n ric h m e n t o f u ra n iu m th a n the diffusion p lan t, w hich m u st now , because of th e success of th e cen trifu g e, be reg ard ed as obsolescent. T h e resu lt of th e jo in t en terp rise is th a t the th re e co u n tries now have large, econom ic e n ric h m e n t p lan ts w ith an o rd e r book for d om estic and ex p o rt o rd ers m easu red in b illions of p o u n d s and em ploying a su b stan tial lab o u r force. It is th e b est and m ost successful exam ple of high tech n o lo g y E u ro p ea n co llaboration.
B ut p u ttin g th e p ro ject to g e th er was n o t easy. O n th e co n tra ry it was difficult in th e extrem e. In th e first place th e tech n o lo g y was highly secret for reasons of n o n -p ro life ra tio n of n u clear w eapons. T h is m ean t th a t th e p arties involved co u ld n o t exchange in fo rm atio n u n til th e th ree g o v ern m e n ts had com e, at least, to ag reem en t in p rin cip le. N eg o tiatin g in th e d ark is n o t th e b est way to en g en d er tru st, and p ro g ress was to an u n u su al degree d ep e n d e n t u p o n th e perso n al frien d sh ip and goodw ill am ong th e negotiato rs.
In th e U .K . these w ere p artic u la r p ro b lem s in relatio n to defence and n u clear defence ag reem en ts w ith th e A m ericans. M atters w ere m ade m ore difficult by th e fact th a t in th e very early days, w ork had been done jo in tly w ith th e A m ericans to establish w h eth er or n o t th e cen trifu g e was a technology th a t w ould be capable of being used by o th e r co u n tries for p ro d u cin g w eap o n s-g rad e u ran iu m . N u m ero u s g o v ern m en t d ep artm en ts w ere in v o lv e d : th e F o reig n Office, th e M in istry of D efence, th e M in istry of T ec h n o lo g y , th e T re a su ry and the C ab in et Office. M u ch th e sam e was tru e in G erm an y and H o llan d . It was n o t an ideal en v iro n m en t to set up a h ig h -tech n o lo g y com m ercial o rg an izatio n th a t to succeed had to m atch th e perfo rm an ce of th e vast e n ric h m en t p lan ts in th e U n ite d States. T h e p ro ject was finally lau n ch ed w ith the signing of the trip a rtite treaty of A lm elo in 1971.
L ooking back at the difficulties th a t w ere en co u n tered it is rem arkable th a t th e project got off the g ro u n d at all. T h e re w ere inevitably differences of view, financial p ro b lem s, m isu n d e rstan d in g s and at one stage accusations of m in isters being m isled. N e d 's tenacity, personality and in teg rity saw th e n eg o tiations th ro u g h , b u t at a cost to him self of a near breakdow n from w hich it took him som e long tim e to recover. B ut recover he did, as he had from tw o m ajor b u t u n co n n ected o p eratio n s he had un d erg o n e a few years earlier. H e w ent on to play a m ajor role in the U ren co project, w hich is th e nam e u n d e r w hich the E u ro p ean cen trifu g e pro ject now operates. Its h ead q u a rters is in M arlow in B u ck in g h am sh ire and the diffusion p lan t th a t p reviously filled th e C a p e n h u rst site in C heshire has now been to rn dow n to m ake space for th e new , efficient and econom ical centrifu g e p lan ts th a t have replaced it.
B ut it was n o t only in technical m a tters th a t N ed was highly attu n ed . H e had visited Jap an on several occasions and these early visits m ade a lasting im pression on him . H e had im m ense ad m iratio n for th e w ork ethic, discipline and q u ality stan d ard s he saw th e re and was in no d o u b t of th e industrial pow er and ability th a t was being created. H e recognized very early on th a t B ritish in d u stry w ith B ritish w ork a ttitu d es w ould not be able to com pete, and was p ro fo u n d ly w o rried by th e com parison. B ut he also saw th a t in nu clear fuel rep ro cessin g B ritish N u clear F uels, w hich he had helped to create and of w hich he was th e n M an ag in g D irecto r, had an ability that, at the tim e, th e Jap an ese did not. T h e discussions th a t he initiated on this m a tter led som e years later to th e signing of th e biggest contracts ever n eg o tiated b etw een B ritain and Jap an , and resu lted in B ritish N uclear F uels b u ild in g , at Sellafield, th e largest chem ical engineering com plex in th e co u n try , a com plex th a t is th e prin cip al su p p o rte r of th e w hole W est C u m b rian econom y.
N ed was by now a M em b er of th e B oard of th e A tom ic E nergy A u th o rity . H is in terests w ere all th in g s n uclear, alth o u g h his resp o n sibilities lay on the p ro d u ctio n side of the in d u stry w here, as the M anaging D irecto r of B ritish N u clear F u els he had resp o n sib ilities for u ran iu m processing, th e en ric h m en t of u ran iu m , n u clear fuel fabrication and reprocessing. H e was active in in tern atio n al affairs because it was clear th a t the size of the d om estic m ark et in any one E u ro p ean co u n try was insufficient to su p p o rt a co m p reh en siv e n u clear in d u stry , and the nuclear in d u stry had to becom e in tern atio n al. Besides the U renco agreem ent, a jo in t en terp rise was set u p w ith F ran ce and G erm an y on reprocessing of n u clear fuel. N ed had also played a m ajor role in negotiating an agreem ent for the d ev elo p m en t of th e fast reacto r system w ith F rance and G erm an y , only to have it blocked by the th e n S ecretary of S tate for E nergy. T h a t sam e ag reem en t was finally signed 10 years later, identical in alm ost every respect w ith th a t agreed earlier, b u t not signed.
N ed spoke F ren ch well and liked to use it w hen he got th e o p p o rtu n ity . H e got on well w ith th e F ren ch and had m any dealings w ith th em in relation to U n ite d R eprocessors (the jo in t B ritish, G erm an and F ren ch reprocessing com pany), N u clear T ra n s p o rt L td (a jo in t nu clear fuel tra n sp o rt com pany) and, of course, the fast reactor. T h is was recognized by the F ren ch g o v ern m en t by the aw ard of th e C hevalier de la L egion d 'H o n n eu r, an aw ard greatly valued by him . W h en it was finally reco g n ized th a t th e B ritish m ark et could su p p o rt no m o re th a n a single n u clear po w er statio n co n stru c tio n co m p an y and th a t th e electricity su p p ly in d u stry co u ld no longer ju stify th e cost of th e p ro liferatio n of reacto r designs and p ro to ty p es th a t had resu lted from th e fra g m e n te d design and co n stru c tio n in d u stry , N ed was in v ited to becom e th e C h ie f E xecutive of th e new ly m erg ed com pany. H e was very h esitan t o f th is ap p ro ach . H e knew all ab o u t n u clear fuel and th e factories th a t p ro cessed and fab ricated it. H e was con fid en t in his grasp of th e p ro b lem s of n u clear m a tters. L ike so m an y of us, how ever, he had little idea of th e im m in en ce or in ten sity of th e gale th a t was to com e from the a n ti-n u cle ar m o v e m en t g ath erin g force in the U .S .A ., or o f th e attacks th a t w ere to be d irec ted at W indscale w h ich , alth o u g h old and b eg in n in g to need new p la n t, had o p erated reaso n ab ly satisfactorily an d extrem ely econom ically for 20 years. H ad he stayed w ith B ritish N u clear F u els he w ould have b een b o th fru s tra te d and ex trem ely w o rried perso n ally by th e attacks d irec ted at W indscale by an ti-n u c le a r cam p aig n ers.
B u t he was finally p ersu ad ed by th e th e n S ecretary of State, Eric V arley, to leave B ritish N u clea r F u els and becom e C h ief E xecutive of the N atio n al N u clea r C o rp o ratio n , th e nam e of th e now m erg ed nuclear co n stru c tio n in d u stry . T h e re is no d o u b t th a t he reg retted th a t decision later. It was n o t th a t he co uld n o t use his abilities in th e reacto r design field, as th e technical and en g in eerin g p ro b lem s w ere entirely up his street, b u t th e p ro b lem s w ere of a d ifferen t n atu re. Som e w ere in tractab le, such as th e appallin g in d u strial relations th a t m ade th e m an ag em en t of c o n stru c tio n sites a n ig h tm are in this c o u n try in th e 1970s. Som e w ere s u rm o u n ta b le only by th e passage of tim e, such as th e collapse of energy d em an d after th e oil shocks of 1974 and 1978. Som e p ro b lem s he p ro b a b ly m ade m ore difficult for h im self by being able to see, p erh ap s too clearly, b o th sides o f th e arg u m e n t. H is sensitivity, com passion and dislike of h u rtin g people gave h im a g reat deal of w orry in an in d u stry having to go th ro u g h m ajo r upheaval.
It was the w rong tim e for anybody to be in charge of n u clear station design and c o n stru ctio n . T h e price of som e p o o r decisions m ade m any years before had n o t yet been paid in full, and the pu b lic had lost faith in science and en g in eerin g believing th a t electricity cam e o ut of the gro u n d .
T h e design of th e tw o n u clear statio n s o rd ered by th e C E G B in 1968 and 1970 was a poo r co ncept, and th is was co m p o u n d ed by the dem and, after th e concrete had been laid, for ad d itio n al safety features to be in c o rp o ra ted . E n fo rced changes in design w hen th e stru c tu re was half b u ilt w ould have played havoc w ith co n stru ctio n schedules even if the c o n stru ctio n lab o u r force h ad been cooperative. In th e circum stances of th e 1970s it was m isery for all concerned. T h e p ro b lem s th a t N ed faced in try in g to rationalize th e n u clear co n stru ctio n in d u stry w ere co m p o u n d ed by lack of decision ab o u t fu tu re strategy. T h e oil shortages of 1973-74, and th e p red ictio n s o f g reater shortages to com e, led the G en eratin g B oard to believe th a t u rg en t m assive o rd erin g of nuclear stations w ould be necessary and th a t this could only be achieved by sw itching to the w idely ad o p ted p ressu rized w ater reacto r (P W R ) system , as had been done by F ran ce a few years earlier. H ow ever, alth o u g h the nuclear inspector had long been aw are of th e safety case for gas-cooled reactors and the steam g en eratin g heavy w ater (S G H W ) reactor, w hich was a variant on the successful C an ad ian C an d u design, no design or safety case for a P W R reacto r had been su b m itted . T h e nu clear in sp ecto r was u n d erstan d ab ly unw illing to give any view on its safety u n til he had the o p p o rtu n ity of stu d y in g the details of th e system . In p articu lar, the integrity of the p ressu re circu it was an issue th a t had n o t yet been finally resolved and no rational strategy was possible u n til these fu n d am en tal questions w ere answ ered.
It was a m ost u n h ap p y perio d for th e n u clear in d u stry . As well as lacking a strategy it had real p ro b lem s of eng in eerin g design and site m anagem ent. It was u n d e r su stain ed attack by th e an ti-n u cle ar lobby w ho could provide far m ore g rip p in g headlines th an th e in d u s try 's defenders. T h e m edia did n o t com e o u t of the deb ate w ith cred it. N ed played his full p art in defen d in g the in d u s try 's record on television, in articles and in public speeches. B ut like m any in the n u clear in d u stry he was very d isap p o in ted at th e pow er of em o tio n over logic in so m u ch of the nuclear debate, a deb ate th a t reached a peak of in ten sity in his latter years in the in d u stry . It is also p erh ap s tru e th a t he expected the w orld to be m ore logical th an it is, and was un ab le to accept th a t m any th ings in this life are not decided by logic b u t by o th e r factors, m any b u ried deep in our inheritance.
N ed left the nuclear in d u stry in 1984 and re tu rn e d to un iv ersity life as P rofessor of N u clear E n g in eerin g at Im p erial C ollege. A lth o u g h depressed by the nu clear scene his in terest in th e nu clear in d u stry was u n d im in ish ed and he co n tin u ed to w rite and lecture on n u clear m atters. H e was p articularly con cern ed ab o u t th e pu b lic d ebate on nu clear safety and the en v iro n m en t, and believed it was being co n d u cted on the basis of em otion devoid of facts or at least devoid of n um eracy. H e was a su p p o rte r of the advanced gas-cooled reactors (A G R ) in the A G R /P W R arg u m en t on the g ro u n d s, ' It is very m u ch b e tte r to have reactors w hich, even th o u g h they do n o t secure the last few p ercen t of capital cost effectiveness, provide the o p erato r h alf an h o u r to reflect u pon the consequences before he has to in terv ene. ' O n the o th er h and, in the H arold H artley M em orial L ec tu re 'T h e hazards of nuclear po w er: m yth or reality ', he pressed the m essage th a t on th e basis of his calculations the 'acc e p ta b le ' ex p en d itu re to save one life in hospital is £ 10 0 0 0 -£ 100 000; in road traffic £0 .5 M ; in existing n u clear installations £1 M -£ 1 0 M , and in prospective nu clear in stallations £ 1 0 0 M . As he said, ' It is estim ated th a t at Sellafield the co n seq u en t red u ctio n in dose level achieved at a cost of £250 M for p ro v id in g and o p eratin g eq u ip m en t to fu rth e r reduce actinide levels will have the effect of red u cin g rad ia tio n -in d u ced deaths of all B ritish w inkle eaters (th e critical g ro u p ) fro m th re e to one in th e next 10000 years.
O ne of N e d 's final p u b lic lectu res was th e M elch e tt L e c tu re of th e I n s titu te of E n erg y at th e R oyal In s titu tio n w here he took as his th em e 'N u c le a r fuel-sw ords in to p lo w s h a re s '. T h e R oyal In s titu tio n was a h a p p y choice of ven u e because he h ad given his first p u b lic lectu re th ere in th e very sam e roo m 40 years p reviously.
H is in te re st in know ledge, alm o st all know ledge, and his readiness to d iscuss and analyse any p ro b lem or issue m ad e h im one of th e easiest of people to talk to I have ever know n. H e felt stro n g ly on m any issues b u t n ev er lost his te m p e r or his capacity to change his m in d if new facts arose to ju stify it. H e c o n tin u e d his in terest in in d u stry and took m o re th a n one n o n -ex ec u tiv e post, in c lu d in g b eco m in g a n o n -ex ecu tiv e d ire c to r of th e e n g in eerin g co n stru c tio n g ro u p A M E C , an d in a co m p an y co n cern ed w ith oil ex p lo ratio n in th e N o rth Sea. H e alw ays k ep t in to u ch w ith his school and his u n iv ersity at L eed s and greatly valued th e H o n .D .S c . th e u n iv e rsity aw arded h im in 1976. H e was a very active m e m b er of th e In s titu tio n of C hem ical E n g in eers and after serving on th e C ouncil becam e P re sid e n t in 1979-80. H e was one o f th e first people to be elected to th e F ellow ship of E n g in eerin g , beco m in g a F ellow in 1978. H is scientific achievem en ts w ere recognized w hen he was elected a F ellow of th e R oyal S ociety in 1981. H e was aw ard ed an O .B .E . in 1963 and a C .B .E . in 1971.
H is life was cu t sh o rt by an illness and o p eratio n of w hich few realized th e seriousness. H e h ad had illnesses and serious o p eratio n s before and had alw ays m ade lig h t of th em , re tu rn in g to w ork before really being signed off by th e d o cto r. H is going is a g reat loss to the n u clear in d u stry to w hich he devoted th e m ajo rity of his w orking life, b u t th e factory at C a p e n h u rst is a lasting trib u te to his pow ers of analysis and tenacity in the face of m u ltip le pro b lem s. A co u rteo u s m an, a gentle m an, a fam ily m an and an intellectual giant. H e is survived by his wife and tw o ch ild ren .
A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s I w ould like to acknow ledge th e help given by D r T o m M arsh am , F .R .S ., of th e A tom ic E n erg y A u th o rity and M r T re v o r E vans of the In stitu tio n of C hem ical E n g in eers T h e p h o to g rap h rep ro d u ced was taken by the N atio n al N u clear C o rp o ratio n L td in ab o u t 1984.
